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ABSTRACT 
If a United Nations peacekeeper allegedly is involved in 
human trafficking, they become part of the problem, 
rather than the solution. This research finds that human 
trafficking and UN peacekeeping frameworks are not 
sufficiently linked to hold peacekeepers accountable for 
alleged human trafficking crimes. International human 
trafficking legislation does not aptly apply to troop-
contributing countries, whose domestic legislation could 
be inefficient in combatting human trafficking. 
Moreover, UN peacekeeping legislation largely omits 
human trafficking. Lastly, there are practical obstacles 
to ensuring accountability due to the UN’s weak 
regulatory system and the reliance of TCCs’ ability and 
willingness to cooperate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a United Nations (UN) mission is deployed in a 
conflict-ridden area, peacekeepers are expected to take 
the role of guardians. Allegations have emerged, 
however, of peacekeepers allegedly involved in crimes 
such as human trafficking.
1
 If peacekeepers do not 
enjoy trust and legitimacy among the local population, 
the mission could lose its credibility. 
Attributing individual responsibility to those very 
peacekeepers who misbehave is, however, a challenge. 
This is because UN personnel are under immunity from 
prosecution in the country where they serve following 
the agreement between the UN and the host country 
(the Status of Forces Agreement or ‘SOFA’).2 
Moreover, the country who contributes personnel, the 
troop-contributing country (TCC), has been given the 
sole jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals deployed on a 
UN operation as written in the agreement between the 
UN and the TCC (Memorandum of Understanding or 
‘MoU’).3 This means that if a peacekeeper allegedly 
commits a crime, the peacekeeper’s TCC has sole 
jurisdiction for disciplinary actions. This leaves room 
for impunity in case of non-prosecution by TCCs.  
This area of research has received limited attention and 
lacks hugely in data. This paper examines the legal 
framework in place to address possible human 
trafficking crimes by UN peacekeepers by trying to 
bridge the two fields of law. To what extent does the 
current legal framework on UN peacekeeping and on 
human trafficking cover human trafficking crimes in 
cases when these are allegedly committed by UN 
peacekeepers? 
The author has limited the scope of this thesis by 
                                                          
1 Harrington 2008, p.230 
2 Model SOFA, para 46. 
3 Model MoU, Article 7 quinquiens  
interpreting ‘peacekeepers’ to national military 
contingents as sent by TCCs.  
Human trafficking is defined according to the definition 
in the Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish 
Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women And 
Children, Supplementing The United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(hereinafter the Trafficking Protocol).
4
 For an act to be 
called ‘human trafficking’, it should contain an action 
(“meaning the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons”), followed by the 
means (“the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion etc.”) and lastly, for a particular goal (“for the 
purpose of exploitation” i.e, prostitution, forced labour 
etc.). For an offence to qualify as human trafficking, 
“one element from each of the above must be present.”5  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Currently, academics have focused on the causes of 
alleged misconduct by UN peacekeepers. One common 
paradigm is “boys will be boys.”6 This is the attitude 
that male soldiers away from home are tacitly allowed 
to rely on sexually misusing people in the host country.
7
 
Due to a predominantly male military, a masculine 
culture arises which helps to create a ‘wall of silence’ 
around sexual misdemeanours.
8
 Consequently, ‘whistle-
blowers’ are stigmatised. 
Other scholars seek to account for the problem in the 
virtual lack of de facto prosecution after misconduct has 
allegedly occurred. Allred claims that peacekeepers 
think of themselves as immune from prosecution for 
committed crimes.
9
 Since in the bilateral agreements, 
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of troops is 
entirely given to the TCC, the UN relies on the ability 
and willingness of the TCC to undertake such actions 
where needed.  
Harrington argues that the socio-legal perceptions of 
peacekeepers from TCCs also play a role. This is 
important since the training of peacekeepers is almost 
exclusively done by the TCCs themselves.
10
 Harrington 
concludes that the peacekeepers’ understandings of 
what they can and cannot do is attributable to the nature 
of the legal structure coupled with the societal view of 
these acts in their home countries.
11
 
Problematically, the debate on human trafficking as 
linked to UN peacekeeping is less in abundance. There 
                                                          
4 Trafficking Protocol, Article 3(a) Definition. 
5 Aronowitz 2009, p.2. 
6 Martin 2005, Executive summary. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., p.6. 
9 Allred 2006, p.9.  
10 Bolkovac 2016, Interview by author.  
11 Harrington, p.292.  
has been an observation, however, that trafficking tends 
to increase during and post-armed conflicts.
12
 In times 
of conflict, individuals may be abducted or trafficked by 
armed groups or the State military for labour, military 
or sexual purposes.
13
 Even more so, Smith and Smith 
posit that the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces 
into a post-conflict area increased the rate of human 
trafficking, due to an increased demand for trafficked 
victims’ services and a more profitable source of 
income for traffickers when a UN mission is deployed.
14
  
 
APPLYING HUMAN TRAFFICKING TO 
PEACEKEEPING 
Human trafficking legislation can be seen on two levels: 
the international plane and the domestic level. Both 
levels give TCCs (international) obligations. 
The Trafficking Protocol 
The main instrument of international law with regard 
to human trafficking is the Trafficking Protocol. This 
Protocol importantly provides a definition for human 
trafficking, calls for international cooperation and 
criminalises every aspect of the definition of human 
trafficking. Whether a TCC is bound by the provisions 
of the Trafficking Protocol depends on the status of 
ratification or signature. Following The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), States 
can express consent to be bound by a treaty “by 
signature, exchange of instruments constituting a 
treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
[...].
15” The Trafficking Protocol requires ratification 
as said in Article 16.3.
16
 If a TCC has ratified the 
Trafficking Protocol, then all provisions of the 
Protocol apply. If a TCC has signed the Trafficking 
Protocol, then following Article 18 of the VCLT, the 
State cannot engage in behaviour that would defeat 
the general “object and purpose”17 of the Protocol. 
This allows for a negative obligation from the State to 
refrain from engaging in human trafficking, but does 
not by any means attribute a positive obligation to 
signatory States to ‘prevent, protect and punish,’ 
which are the main goals of the Trafficking Protocol.
18
 
For States that have neither signed nor ratified the 
Protocol, it is more difficult to argue that they are 
bound by the content of the treaty. It is a well-known 
rule that treaties cannot be imposed upon States 
without their consent.
19
 
The importance of domestic legislation 
The Trafficking Protocol only provides a definition of 
human trafficking, and has in itself limited 
enforcement powers.
20
 Therefore, it is equally 
necessary to assess the domestic legislation of a TCC 
                                                          
12 Gallagher 2010, p.430. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Smith and Smith 2010, p.13.  
15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 11.  
16 Trafficking Protocol, Article 16.3.  
17 VCLT, Article 18. 
18 Ibid. 
19 VCLT supra note 191, Art 34. The essence of the law of 
treaties dictates that ‘pacta sunt servanda’, namely treaties are 
only binding when the entity consents to them. 
20 Aronowitz 2016, Interview by author and limitations of 
Trafficking Protocol in Gallagher, pp.47-53. 
if some of its peacekeepers are allegedly involved in 
human trafficking. An analysis of the domestic 
legislation in place helps to see how peacekeepers of 
those countries can be held accountable domestically 
for human trafficking crimes. Moreover, scholars such 
as Harrington have argued that there exists a 
correlation between the existence and strength of 
domestic legislation on human trafficking and the 
frequency of allegations. Important to ask when  
assessing domestic legislation is firstly whether 
human trafficking is criminalised under national 
legislation and if so, which forms of human trafficking 
are criminalised? Secondly, to what extent are the 
domestic laws in this field being enforced? It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to assess national 
legislation of individual countries.
21
 The 
aforementioned research has indicated, however, that 
human trafficking has often been criminalised, albeit 
to different degrees. Moreover, the enforcement of 
human trafficking laws is frequently insufficient. 
 
LINKING PEACEKEEPING TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
UN peacekeeping relies on a number of policies 
amongst which the ‘Code of Conduct’ (which include 
ten rules of behaviour for peacekeepers), the bilateral 
agreements (the SOFA and the MoU), Security-
Council resolutions and policy documents. For 
peacekeepers from TCCs, the documents which are 
legally binding upon their national countries are the 
MoU (which is a legal contract) and the Security-
Council resolutions. 
Terminology: Human trafficking is not 
appropriately addressed 
A common observation to UN policies, with the 
exception of Security-Council Resolution S/RES/1674 
(2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
is that human trafficking is not explicitly mentioned as 
a crime. In the current terminology, any allegations 
towards peacekeepers are classified as ‘sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA).’22 Although this crime 
is distinct from human trafficking, it is the only type 
of crime which has clearly been addressed through 
policy documents and the UN Conduct and Discipline 
Unit.
23
 Arguably, overlaps exists when it comes to 
some aspects of sex trafficking, namely the 
exploitation of sex related labour. However, reducing 
human trafficking to SEA would exclude many 
aspects of human trafficking, such as labour 
trafficking, and instead equate human trafficking to 
sex related crimes. 
Vague formulations: The ‘Local Population’ and 
‘Respect’ 
The rules under the Code of Conduct and the MoU, 
for example, state that peacekeepers have to ‘respect 
the local laws’ and ‘treat the inhabitants of the host 
                                                          
21 See Harrington for a detailed overview of the legislation of 
TCCs who received allegations against its peacekeepers. 
22 Used for example in the Model MoU.   
23 Ibid., the Conduct and Discipline Unit’s “About” page 
looks notably at SEA and provides a link to the Security 
Council Resolution UNSC S/RES/2272 on SEA. 
country with respect, courtesy and consideration.’24 
From a strict textual interpretation, respecting “the 
inhabitants of the host country” or “the local 
population” would exclude trafficked victims from 
abroad as they are technically not inhabitants if 
trafficked without documents for example, nor part of 
the local population. Trafficked victims might reside 
temporarily in the host country, but this does not make 
them an inhabitant.  
A second recurring use of terminology is ‘respect.’ 
Engaging in human trafficking would not be 
‘respectful’ to the local population nor would it 
respect the laws of the host country. However, what 
obligations exist if ‘respect’ is used? Currently, the 
key human rights obligations are formulated in 
‘respect, protect and fulfil.’25 Instead of using a much 
stronger obligation, such as ‘fulfil,’ respect is a 
negative obligation which merely entails refraining 
from a type of behaviour.
26
 Understandably, these 
three interpretations cannot be applied to the same 
extent to States Parties as to individual peacekeepers, 
but it does signal the type of language in the internal 
rules is vague and ill-defined. 
 
PRACTICAL OBSTACLES  
The apparent legal gap in assuring accountability for 
human trafficking crimes if allegedly committed by 
UN peacekeepers might enable political involvement. 
The UN’s reliance on TCCs 
When an allegation arises within a  peacekeeping 
mission, the UN has the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services (OIOS) to conduct internal investigations, 
but the latter lacks criminal jurisdiction over 
personnel.
27
 Following the MoU, investigations have 
to be conducted in cooperation with the TCC and 
under Article 7 quater investigations of the Model 
MoU, the TCC has the main responsibility over 
investigations into allegations. The OIOS merely has a 
secondary and assisting role. This leaves the UN with 
the hope that TCCs follow up on their obligations 
under the MoU to prosecute the peacekeepers 
suspected of wrongdoing. 
The TCC’s ability to cooperate 
Although TCCs thus bear the main responsibility for 
disciplinary actions, would the TCCs have the laws in 
place to prosecute peacekeepers for alleged human 
trafficking crimes? Would the justice system have 
enough strength on its own to determine the merits of 
a criminal case, and, the ability to enforce the 
decision? Such independence and capacity relate 
among other factors to the nature of the country’s 
regime, the degree of separation of powers (executive, 
legislative and judicial) and the level of corruption. 
Moreover, the TCC must have the resources to 
conduct investigations abroad and gather evidence and 
victim statements for a case to be substantiated. 
                                                          
24 Model MoU, Annex H or DPKO Ten Rules (emphasis added) 
25 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2006, p.2.   
26 Ibid. 
27 Verdirame 2011, p.217. 
Lastly, peacekeepers hold an abstract legal status: 
Whereas the UN has insisted that while exercising the 
mandate, peacekeepers are under its effective 
control,
28
 the MoU clearly attributes responsibility for 
disciplinary actions to TCCs. In the H.N. v. the 
Netherlands case, which dealt with collective 
responsibility (rather than individual responsibility) of 
the Dutch bats’ actions in Srebrenica during the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina war, the District Court in The 
Hague had to deal with obtaining reparations for 
violations by peacekeepers.
29
 The original judgement 
from the Court was that the Netherlands “bore no 
responsibility for the acts or omissions of Dutch bat”, 
since the actions of the Dutch contingents’ troops 
were under effective control of the UN, not the 
Netherlands,
30
 thus showing the obstacles in 
attributing responsibility. 
The TCC’s willingness to cooperate 
Moreover, the TCCs might not be willing to take 
disciplinary actions. Bolkovac rightly asks: "Do you 
think that the Dutch government or the US 
government is going to send some investigator over to 
Afghanistan and go look for a sixteen year old girl 
that got [trafficked] by some soldier?”31 Even though 
the TCCs might have the responsibility to investigate 
into allegations, the MoU does not mention how 
thorough investigations should be conducted nor can it 
force the TCCs to continue with disciplinary actions.
32
 
Far more likely, according to Bolkovac, is that the 
allegations will be watered down and if prosecutions 
take place this will concern minor crimes.
33
 
Furthermore, if the crime of human trafficking is 
surrounded with social stigma, this might make it 
more difficult to rally the political support to 
undertake action. If an act is not recognised to be a 
crime in the country where the peacekeeper comes 
from, the TCC might not see the necessity to 
prosecute. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, human trafficking and UN peacekeeping 
are not sufficiently linked to hold wrong-doing 
peacekeepers accountable. Human trafficking applies 
only to UN peacekeepers to some degree, for example 
to TCCs who have integrated the Trafficking 
Protocol’s definition and criminalisation into national 
laws. The Trafficking Protocol is, however, too weak 
on its own and national legislation ought to 
compensate to ensure accountability. In the field of 
UN peacekeeping, there are numerous rules applicable 
to peacekeepers, but these rules contain limitations: 
Firstly, it is unclear what the applicability of these 
rules is, namely which rules apply to which type of 
peacekeepers (civilian or staff for example)? 
Secondly, human trafficking is barely mentioned and 
the current provisions cannot effectively cover human 
                                                          
28 Dannenbaum 2010, p.115. 
29 The Netherlands v. Hasan Nuhanović. Judgement, 2013. 
30 Dannenbaum, p.121-122. 
31 Bolkovac 2016, Interview. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
trafficking. Lastly, the enforcement of the rules is 
questionable.  
Undoubtedly, there are political factors involved, 
perhaps even facilitated due to the legal lacuna. The 
UN’s internal regulatory system lacks the enforcement 
mechanisms for its decisions, as the TCC holds 
jurisdiction over any further disciplinary action. 
Whether the TCC is willing or able to comply is 
questionable in some countries where the legal system 
might not be strong enough or corruption might lead to 
a lack of further action. 
Accountability for UN peacekeepers for alleged 
human trafficking crimes is a vast field where much 
research still needs to be done. There is no clear 
answer as to what legal status peacekeepers have 
under international law. This poses obstacles in 
national Court cases. Furthermore, ensuring 
compliance with responsibilities under the MoU is 
important so as to guarantee that disciplinary actions 
will be taken against peacekeepers and to put an end to 
impunity for human trafficking crimes. 
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